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Abstract—In a cascading power transmission outage, com-
ponent outages propagate non-locally; after one component
outages, the next failure may be very distant, both topologically
and geographically. As a result, simple models of topological
contagion do not accurately represent the propagation of cascades
in power systems. However, cascading power outages do follow
patterns, some of which are useful in understanding and reducing
blackout risk. This paper describes a method by which the data
from many cascading failure simulations can be transformed
into a graph-based model of influences that provides actionable
information about the many ways that cascades propagate in
a particular system. The resulting “influence graph” model is
Markovian, in that component outage probabilities depend only
on the outages that occurred in the prior generation. To validate
the model we compare the distribution of cascade sizes resulting
from n − 2 contingencies in a 2896 branch test case to cascade
sizes in the influence graph. The two distributions are remarkably
similar. In addition, we derive an equation with which one can
quickly identify modifications to the proposed system that will
substantially reduce cascade propagation. With this equation one
can quickly identify critical components that can be improved to
substantially reduce the risk of large cascading blackouts.
Index Terms—Cascading failure, big data, complex networks
I. INTRODUCTION
POWER systems are generally robust to small disturbances,but unexpected combinations of failures sometimes ini-
tiate long chains of cascading outages, which can result in
massive and costly blackouts. Because of the low-probability
high-impact nature of cascading failures, there is limited
empirical data from which to understand the many ways that
cascades propagate through a power system. Simulations of
cascading mechanisms can produce data, but there has been
insufficient progress in extracting insights and useful statistical
information from these data.
One approach to obtaining useful information is to try
and leverage successes from network science, which has an
extensive literature on cascading failure and (more generally)
contagion. Models of topological contagion in which failures
spread locally from a node to its immediate neighbors [1],
[2], [3] have provided insight into a variety of problems, such
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as disease propagation [4], [5]. Similar topological contagion
models have been suggested as a tool for power systems
analysis (e.g., [6], [7]).
This approach has two problems. First, in power grids it is
more appropriate to focus first on line (edge) outages, since
line outages are an order of magnitude more likely than node
(substation) outages. More importantly, as is well known to
power systems engineers, cascading outages in power systems
propagate non-locally as well as locally. In a power grid, the
next component to fail after a particular line outages may be
very distant, both geographically and topologically [8]. This
can be seen very clearly from the sequence of events in the
Western US blackout of 1996, shown in Fig. 1, in which the
failure sequence jumps across long distances at several points
in the cascade. Cascades in power networks are more similar
to the random fuse model [9] from statistical physics, in which
non-local propagation does occur.
Fig. 1. An illustration of the event sequence for the Western US blackout on
July 2, 1996 (from [10]). The sequence jumps across hundreds of kilometers
at several points, such as from 3 - 4 and from 7 - 8 .
On the other hand, simulation models that capture as-
pects of detailed power grid physics and engineering are
useful for understanding how cascades propagate. Impor-
tantly these models do show the non-local propagation that
is apparent in historical cascades. Examples of physics-
based models of cascading include quasi-steady state models,
such as DCSIMSEP [11], [12], OPA [13], [14], Manchester
model [15], and TRELSS [16], and dynamic models, such as
COSMIC [17] and the hybrid model in [18]. While engineer-
ing models are useful, the data that result from this type of
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2simulation are complicated and difficult to summarize, even
for a single cascading failure simulation. In order to obtain
useful statistical information, thousands, or even millions of
simulations are often required, resulting in enormous sets of
complicated output data. To summarize and understand big
data from detailed simulations, there is a need for higher-level
models of cascading in large-scale systems that are simple
enough to provide statistical insight, without abstracting away
physical details in a way that could lead to erroneous con-
clusions. Only a few such statistical models, which do not
neglect the non-local nature of cascading, have been proposed
in the literature. Reference [19] finds critical clusters of lines
in simulated cascade data using a synchronization matrix,
which determines the critical clusters as sets of lines that
frequently overload in the same cascade and in a cascade that
leads to a large blackout. This approach does not consider the
order in which the lines overload during the cascade, but does
indicate combinations of critical lines that are associated with
blackouts. The general idea of building an influence graph
describing ways that component failures might spread goes
back to [20], [21].
This form of influence graph couples Markov processes
at each node, but it remains unknown how to construct
these influence graphs from data. Stochastic models in [22],
[23] use Markov-chains to represent key characteristics of
simulated cascades. In prior work, the authors proposed a
“line-interaction graph” approach to modeling cascades from
data [24]. A matrix-based approach, which is in some ways
similar to ours, was used to describe the probability of a
cascade propagating from one network node to another in [25].
Ref. [25] is primarily motivated by avalanches of neurons
firing, but also mentions blackouts, and analyzes the the
statistics of the number of generations in a cascade as well
as the number of failures. One difference is that [25] restores
nodes in the generation after they fail, which allows cascades
to propagate through previously failed nodes and prolongs the
cascades. The ideas in [24] were extended in [26] to build an
interaction model of cascading that can reproduce statistical
properties of simulated cascades.
This paper presents a new influence graph method, also
based on the concepts in [24], in which we take large amounts
of data from cascade simulations and synthesize the data into
a Markovian network model. Importantly, the resulting model
has a network structure through which cascades propagate
locally, but that network structure is dramatically different
from that of the original power network. That is, the outages
propagate along the influence graph, which is completely
different than the graph topology of the grid. We emphasize
that any cascading failure simulation based on engineering
principles can be used to produce the data needed to synthesize
the influence graph.
II. METHOD: STATISTICAL MODELING OF NON-LOCAL
CASCADES
A cascading failure begins with one or more initiating
events, typically component outages. For example a tree falls
into a transmission line, or an operator error results in one
or more component outages. Each initiating event will perturb
the state of the network, which may result in excessive stress
on other components. Because of the laws of power flow,
these stressed components may be topologically distant from
the initiating events. Excessive stress may cause one or more
dependent outages, which may subsequently cause additional
stress and additional outages. Together this sequence is a
cascading failure.
Prior work [27] has shown that one can gain substantial
insight into the statistical properties of cascading failure by
grouping sequences of component outages into generations,
and looking at the growth (or propagation) rates among
generations. Typically, the first generation represents the ex-
ogenously caused initiating events. Subsequent generations
can be thought of as “children” of prior “parent” outage
generations. In this branching process model, each generation
of failures produces some number of dependent failures and
the rate at which prior generation (parent) outages cause new
(child) outages is known as the propagation rate, λ. If |Z0|
is the total number of outages (over many cascades) in the
set of all initiating events over many cascades and |Z1| is the
number of outages in the first dependent generation, then the
propagation rate from generation zero into the first generation
is: λ0 = |Z1|/|Z0|. More generally:
λm =
|Zm+1|
|Zm| (1)
However, the approach of [27] simply counts outages with-
out discriminating which component outages will result from a
particular prior outage, or how the components relate to other
components. It is clear that component outages vary in their
frequency and impact on other components. For example, the
outage of a large transmission line carrying a large amount of
power is likely to result in more dependent outages than the
failure of a smaller line. Thus, it is useful to consider different
components as having different propagation rates. With this
in mind, our model assumes that each component i produces
a random number, Ki,m, of child outages according to the
following conditional probability function:
f [k|i,m] = Pr[ k outages in generation m+ 1, given
a single outage of i in generation m] (2)
In this paper we assume that f [k|i,m] is a Poisson distribution,
with λi,m representing the mean number of outages propagated
by the outage of i in generation(s) m.
Finally, if component i outages and causes a dependent
outage in the next generation, some components are more
likely to outage in the next generation than others. For the case
of line outages, this increased likelihood comes from a number
of factors including the way in which currents are redistributed
(which can be estimated from line outage distribution factors)
and the proximity of particular components to their tripping
threshold. Therefore, it is important to model the conditional
probability of component j failing, given the failure of i. Let:
g[j|i,m] = Pr[ j fails in generation m+ 1 given
a single outage of i in generation m
and one outage in generation m+ 1] (3)
3For each generation m, g[j|i,m] can be considered as the i, j
element of a matrix that defines a weighted, directed graph of
influences among components.
Together f and g form a model, here referred to as an
influence graph, that is Markovian in the sense that the outage
probabilities depend only on the outages that occurred in the
prior generation (see Sec. III).
A. Estimating the parameters for f and g from data
In this paper we estimate the parameters for f and g from
data obtained from many cascading failure simulations. While
it may be possible in principle to design a method to estimate f
and g directly from engineering information about the system,
doing so would require extensive knowledge and difficult
assumptions about how cascades propagate. By estimating the
model’s parameters from data our method can be applied to
any cascading simulation or model, so long as there is a
discrete set of components that can fail, and these failures
can be grouped into generations.
Let us assume then that a trusted engineering simulation
model of cascading failure exists for a given network at a
particular state, and that we can perturb this model with many
random disturbances and thus produce a large amount of
cascading failure sequence data. The first step in building the
influence graph is to group the outages from the sequence data
into generations, typically by dividing the event sequences by
finding pairs of events that are separated by some amount of
time (see [28], [27]). After this grouping, we can let Z(d)m
represent the set of outages in generation m of cascade d, and
|Z(d)m | represent the number of outages within this set.
In order to estimate f one first needs to decide the extent
to which f will be modeled to depend on the generation m.
For most of the results in this paper we provide separate
estimates of f for the initiating generation f [k|i, 0] and for
the subsequent generations f [k|i, 1+]. The rationale for this
is that the n − 1 security criterion results in networks being
quite robust to initial outages, but after a cascade has already
started outages propagate with a much higher probability. For
the simulated cascades used in this paper, this propagation
rate does not change dramatically among the subsequent
generations of dependent outages (m ≥ 1), denoted by 1+.
Thus, we describe the post-initiating-event propagation rates
using the single (vector) distribution f [k|i, 1+].
We assume that f [k|i,m] follows a Poisson distribution,
and need to estimate the Poisson parameter (the mean of
Ki,m) for each component i and each generation (or set of
generations), m. Let Pi,m represent the number of times (in
a set of cascades) that each component i appears as a parent
outage in generation(s) m, and Ci,m denote the total number of
“effective children” that result from the outage of component i
in the respective generation(s). More specifically, if Di,m is
the set of cascades within which i appears as a parent in
generation(s) m, then:
Pi,m = |Di,m| (4)
Ci,m =
∑
d∈Di,m
|Z(d)m+1|
|Z(d)m |
(5)
For example, if i fails along with one other component j in
generation 0 of a particular cascade and generation 1 of that
same cascade includes three outages, we would count 3/2 =
1.5 additional “effective children” for each of i and j, and
thus add 1.5 to Ci,0 and Cj,0 and increment both Pi,0 and
Pj,0. After counting Pi,m and Ci,m for all of the cascades
in a dataset, the Poisson parameter for f [k|i,m] is λi,m =
Ci,m/Pi,m.
When defined in this way, the weighted average (over i)
of each λi,m is equal to the overall propagation rate for the
respective generation(s), λm. For the specific case in which
we estimate two sets of parameters for λi,0 and λi,1+ we get
the following pair of relationships:
λ0 =
|Z1|
|Z0| =
∑n
i=1 λi,0Pi,0∑n
i=1 Pi,0
(6)
λ1+ =
∑M−1
m=1 |Zm+1|∑M−1
m=1 |Zm|
=
∑n
i=1 λi,1+Pi,1+∑n
i=1 Pi,1+
(7)
where M is the maximum generation index m over all of the
cascades in the dataset.
To build the graph of inter-component influences, G, we
again iterate through each cascade d and generation m. For
each d and m in which i occurs as a parent and j occurs as
a child in the next generation (m + 1), we add the fraction
1/|Z(d)m | to a counter gc[j|i]. Finally, the individual elements
of G are estimated as follows:
g[j|i] = gc[j|i]∑n
j=1 gc[j|i]
(8)
Normalizing in this way ensures that g[j|i] acts as a con-
ditional probability, as per our definition in (3), such that∑n
j=1 g[j|i] = 1. Note that in this paper we assume that g
does not change with generation m. The reason for this is that
even with data from many simulated cascades, only a fairly
limited number of observations are available for most of the
potential sequence pairs i→ j.
B. 6-bus illustration
To illustrate the process of building f and g, this section
describes the formation of the influence graph for a slightly
modified version of the Wood and Wollenberg 6-bus test
case [29] (see Fig. 2). After removing two transmission lines
(for graphical clarity), all of the pre-contingency line flows
were below the rated limits, but the system was not initially
n − 1 secure. To generate cascading outage data, 1000 sets
of one or more initiating outages were randomly generated
assuming that each of the nine transmission lines had an
equal outage probability of p0 = 1/100. Dependent outage
sequences were generated using the DCSIMSEP cascading
failure model from [11], [12]. These sequences were then
grouped into generations by separating outages that were
distant in time by at least ∆t = 5 seconds. Note that this is a
relatively small value for ∆t compared to previous branching
process applications (e.g., [27]). Since the 6-bus case is very
small, and used here only to illustrate the influence graph
concept, choosing a small ∆t seemed appropriate. Given data
separated into generations we computed a single distribution
4for f , as shown in Table I. Similarly the parameters for g were
computed as described in Sec. II-A. The results for f and g
are illustrated in Fig. 3.
A number of observations result from inspection of f and
g. From f we see that one of the nine lines (line 2-4) has a
much higher propagation rate than the other eight, a clear sign
of its critical importance to this particular system. We also find
two different common paths of cascading. One path includes
the set of lines {3-6,5-6,1-2,1-4} and a second includes {3-
5,4-5,2-5,2-3}. The outage of 2-4 can propagate a subset of
either of these two paths.
TABLE I
PARAMETERS FOR f FOR THE 6-BUS TEST CASE
Line: 1-2 1-4 2-3 2-4 2-5 3-5 3-6 4-5 5-6
Pi 412 416 401 106 498 100 104 503 193
Ci 208.5 98.5 195.5 401 298.5 99 102 297.5 107.5
λi 0.51 0.24 0.49 3.78 0.60 0.99 0.98 0.59 0.56
Fig. 2. The modified 6 bus test case with three generators (circles) and 3
loads (triangles). Line widths indicate absolute line loading (MW) and colors
indicate precent of rated loading.
Fig. 3. Illustration of the influence graph for the 6-bus test case. The edge
weights represent the conditional probability of one line outage propagating
associated line outages.
III. SIMULATING CASCADING FAILURES GIVEN f AND g
Once formed, f and g can be used to rapidly generate many
synthetic cascades, which have statistical properties similar to
those of the original data.
To simulate the influence graph (see Fig. 4), we start with
a large set of initiating events. These can be produced by a
variety of sampling methods, such as Monte-Carlo or complete
Fig. 4. Illustration of an influence graph simulation for a small network
with six components. Initially node 2 fails due to some exogenous cause.
Based on a draw from f2, this failure causes k = 2 dependent failures in
the next generation. Drawing twice from g[j|i = 2] results in nodes 1 and
5 failing in the next generation. In generation 1, the failure of node 1 does
not produce any additional children, but the failure of 3 produces one “child”
failure (node 3). Finally, the failure of node 3 does not produce any children,
thus ending the cascade.
enumeration of a plausible contingency list (e.g., all n− 2’s).
For Monte-Carlo sampling, if initiating outages are assumed
to be independent, then this can be a simple vector of failure
probabilities for each of n components. Given the chosen
sampling method, the influence graph can be simulated as
follows:
1) Initialize the cascade index: d = 1
2) Initialize the generation index: m = 0
3) Produce a set of exogenous initiating outages Z(d)0 via
the chosen sampling method.
4) For each outage i ∈ Z(d)m , do the following: (a) Deter-
mine how many child outages κ result from i by sampling
from f [k|i,m]. (b) Determine which outages result from
outage i by sampling from g[j|i] κ times. This sampling
is done using Bernoulli trials, such that for each trial
{1 . . . κ} component j will fail if g[j|i] > r, where r
is a uniformly distributed random number 0 ≤ r ≤ 1.
The result is a set of outages for the next dependent
generation, Z(d)m+1.
5) If Z(d)m+1 includes at least one outage, then increment the
generation index m = m+ 1 and continue from Step 4.
6) Otherwise, increment the cascade counter d = d+ 1 and
continue from Step 2.
Note that a given component j may be selected for failure
more than once. Since a component cannot fail multiple times
(and restoration is not included in this model), this means that
the total number of new child outages may be slightly less
than κ.
A. Simulated cascades in a larger test case
To illustrate the influence graph method, we produced a
dataset of cascading outages by simulating the impact of each
n−2 transmission branch (transformer or line) outage in an n−
51 secure version of the winter peak Polish case available with
MATPOWER [30], using the same simulator (DCSIMSEP)
and case data as in [11], [12]. The test case has n = 2896
branches, which resulted in n(n− 1)/2 = 4 191 960 initiating
n − 2 contingencies, of which 3170 resulted in at least one
dependent outage. Fig. 5 shows the distribution of cascade
sizes for this dataset.
Fig. 5. Probability distribution of cascade sizes, measured by the number
of branches failed, for the original DCSIMSEP simulation data (empirical),
and for the influence graph (simulated) data. Data are binned so that each bin
contains at least 26 observations.
Fig. 6. Empirical probability density functions for the component-wise
propagation rates in the initiating generation, λi,0, and the subsequent
generations, λi,1+. Data are binned as in Fig. 5.
The outage data were subsequently separated into gen-
erations by assigning all of the initiating outages to the
first generation and distributing the dependent events into
subsequent generations by assigning events that were at least
30 seconds apart [27] to different generations. We chose this
value for ∆t based on the fact that fast transients and auto-
recloser actions are typically completed within 30 seconds.
We also tested ∆t = 15s and ∆t = 60s, and found that
the parameters for f were not substantially altered within
this range. After separating the outage data into generations,
the parameters for f and g were constructed as described in
Sec. II-A. Figure 6 shows the distribution of values for λi,0
and λi,1+. Notably, both distributions are heavy tailed; for the
majority of components λi,m = 0, but a few components tend
to produce a much larger number of “child” outages.
Finally, we simulated artificial cascades by applying each of
the 4 191 960 possible n− 2 contingencies with the resulting
influence graph. Figure 5 shows the resulting probability
distribution of cascade sizes, measured as the total number of
outages in each cascade (including the initiating outages), for
the empirical data and the simulated data from the influence
graph. The influence graph method matches the empirical
data quite well, with the exception that the influence graph
does not reproduce the frequency of the very longest cascades
observed in the empirical data. Otherwise the match between
the simulated and empirical data is quite good.
Another way to compare the influence graph data to the
original data is to look at the frequency with which particular
components appear in the two datasets. One would expect a
valid model of the original data to show that component i
outages with a frequency that is similar to its outage rate in
the original data. To evaluate if this is indeed the case, Figure 7
compares the outage rates (the number of dependent outages
of i divided by the total number of dependent outages) in the
simulated data and in the empirical data. The match between
these two rates provides further evidence for the validity of
this approach.
Fig. 7. Comparison of the outage rate of components in the influence-graph
simulated data and in the original cascading failure data. Circles (◦) show
the rates for all dependent events and × shows only dependent events that
occurred in generation m = 4 and later.
IV. EXTRACTING USEFUL INFORMATION FROM THE
INFLUENCE GRAPH
Once the influence graph (f and g) is built from data the
results can shed valuable insight into the general properties of
cascading in a particular system.
In order to do so, we first combine f and g into a single
graph H that captures the relative strength of the influences
among the component outages. Consider that in an arbitrary
generation m of influence-graph-simulated cascade d, com-
ponent i fails alone (Z(d)m = {i}) and a random draw from
f [k|i,m] indicates that there should be (about) K = k failures
in the next generation. Then the conditional probability that a
particular component j fails in the next generation (m + 1),
6given that i failed in generation m and that generation m+ 1
includes exactly k failures is:
Pr(j|{i, k}) = 1− (1− g[j|i])k (9)
Let hi,j,m be the conditional probability that a particular
component j fails in generation m + 1 given that i failed
in m, over all values of k. hi,j,m can be computed from (9)
using the assumption that K is a Poisson random variable:
hi,j,m =
n−1∑
k=0
Pr(j|{i, k})f [k|i,m] (10)
∼
∞∑
k=0
(
1− (1− g[j|i])k) f [k|i,m] (11)
=
∞∑
k=0
(
1− (1− g[j|i])k) λki,m
k!
e−λi,m (12)
= 1− e−λi,meλi,m(1−g[j|i]) (13)
= 1− e−λi,mg[j|i] (14)
Thus defined, hi,j,m can be thought of as the i, j element of
a matrix Hm that combines f and g. Hm has the properties
of a weighted adjacency matrix for a directed graph. Since,
for our larger test case, we defined two different distributions
for f [k|i,m = 0] and f [k|i,m = 1+], we end up with two
different matrices H0 and H1+ that, respectively, describe the
propagation of the initiating contingency and the subsequent
dependent events. Note that the nodes of the influence graph
do not represent system states, and thus H differs from a
typical Markov chain transition matrix. In particular, H is not
a stochastic matrix because the events comprising one of the
components outaging after component i outages are neither
exclusive nor exhaustive; it is routine that no components or
several components outage after component i outages.
A. Using H to find critical components
A particularly important question in the study of cascading
failure risk is that of identifying critical components, the
failure of which could result in particularly large cascading
failures. Or, more practically, finding components that could
be improved in some way to substantially reduce blackout risk.
Prior work [12], [31] has suggested that some components,
when they fail as a part of a multiple initiating contingency,
contribute orders of magnitude more to blackout risk, relative
to the average component. Here we suggest a method for
using the information contained in H0 and H1+ to find those
components that could propagate large cascading failures if
they fail during a cascade, as opposed to during the initiating
contingency. This type of information could be useful to
power system planners in identifying components that should
be prioritized for more thorough vegetation management or
upgraded protection systems, or to operators in making adjust-
ments to the dispatch to reduce blackout risk by decreasing
line loadings.
We start by defining a vector of independent binary
(Bernoulli) random variables, s0, that describes the space
of possible initiating contingencies. s0 is defined such that
si,0 = 1 indicates that component i outages as a part of
the initiating contingency and si,0 = 0 means that i did not
initially fail. pi,0 is the probability that si,0 = 1 and thus pi,0
also is also the expected value of si,0. More generally, let pi,m
represent the probability that i outages in generation m, and
pm be the column vector of these probabilities.
Let us now use Hm and the outage probabilities pm to
find the probability that a particular component j outages in
generation m+1. hi,j,m gives us the probability that j outages
in generation m + 1, given that i outaged in generation m.
The probability pj,m+1 that j outages in generation m + 1
is the probability of the union of all the ways that j might
have failed. If the individual interaction probabilities in H are
small and the ways are independent (or disjoint), then we can
neglect the higher order probabilities (such as the probability
that j failed due to the combination of i and k), and obtain
the following approximation for the probability that j fails in
generation m+ 1:
pj,m+1 ∼=
n∑
i=1
Pr[j(m+ 1)|i(m)] Pr[i(m)] (15)
=
n∑
i=1
hi,j,mpi,m (16)
As a result, the outage probabilities in the first and subsequent
generations can be estimated by simple matrix multiplication:
pᵀ1 = p
ᵀ
0H0 (17)
pᵀm+1 = p
ᵀ
mH1+ , m ≥ 1. (18)
After a long cascade, the probability of each component having
failed at some point during a cascade (the vector a) can be
found as follows:
aᵀ ,
∞∑
m=0
pᵀm = p
ᵀ
0 + p
ᵀ
0H0
∞∑
m=0
Hm1+ (19)
Eq. (19) will evaluate to a finite quantity, so long as the abso-
lute values of the eigenvalues of H1+ are less than 1, which
holds for our test cases. Since
∑∞
m=0H
m
1+ = (I −H1+)−1,
Eq. (19) can be rewritten more simply as:
aᵀ = pᵀ0 + p
ᵀ
0H0(I−H1+)−1 (20)
This is a useful expression as it enables us to quickly under-
stand which components are most likely to be involved in a
cascading failure. Also, the sum of a gives an estimate of the
expected size of the cascades that could result from the vector
of initiating probabilities p0.
Now we turn our attention to using (20) to estimate the
impact of design changes on cascading failure propagation.
Let us assume that we know that if we upgrade component j
(perhaps by replacing line j’s distance relays with current
differential relays, or improving vegetation management on
its transmission corridor) we can reduce the probability of line
j outaging due to an overload, in response to other outages
in the system. We can represent this change by reducing the
probabilities in the jth column of H0 and H1+ by subtracting
column perturbation vectors δ0 and δ1 from H0 and H1+,
7respectively. Then the result of the perturbations to H0 and
H1+ can be estimated by calculating
a′j
ᵀ
= pᵀ0 + p
ᵀ
0(H0 − δ0eᵀj )(I−H1+ + δ1eᵀj )−1 (21)
where ej is an indicator vector with 1 in the jth element and
0 elsewhere.
However, what we really care about, if we want to estimate
the impact of potential upgrades, is the change in a that results
from the perturbations δ0 and δ1, not the absolute value of a′j .
This change is computed by subtracting (21) from (20):
∆aj
ᵀ = aᵀ − a′jᵀ = (22)
pᵀ0
(
H0(I−H1+)−1 − (H0 − δ0eᵀj )(I−H1+ + δ1eᵀj )−1
)
Applying the Sherman-Morrison formula [32] for rank-1 up-
dates of an inverted matrix and simplifying leads to:
∆aj
ᵀ =pᵀ0δ0e
ᵀ
j (I−H1+)−1+ (23)
pᵀ0(H0 − δ0eᵀj )
(I−H1+)−1δ1eᵀi (I−H1+)−1
1 + eᵀj (I−H1+)−1δ1
Finally we can sum ∆aj to define the overall impact αj of
modifications δ0 and δ1 on line j:
αj =
n∑
k=1
∆aj,k (24)
By computing αj for each line j from the parameters of the
influence graph we can quickly estimate the impact of potential
modifications without the need for extensive simulations of
these modifications. This metric (24) allows us to quickly
compute, from data, the relative importance (or “criticality”)
of particular components in a power system.
B. Critical components in the 6-bus case
To illustrate the result of combining f and g to produce
a single influence graph, as defined in (14), Fig. 8 shows
H for the 6-bus test case presented in Sec. II-B. (For this
small case we assume that H = H0 = H1+.) This figure
clearly shows the importance of line (2-4), since it has a
high likelihood of initiating four subsequent outages, which
can, in turn, propagate additional outages. However, (2-4) only
appears as a initiating event, as indicated by the fact that this
node has zero in-degree; other outages do not result in the
outage of (2-4). As a result, modifying the probability of (2-4)
failing endogenously (within a cascade) will not have an effect
on cascade sizes. On the other hand, the failure of either (2-5)
or (4-5) can propagate as many as three additional outages,
making these components candidates for potential upgrades.
Fig. 8. Illustration of the combined influence matrix H for the 6 bus case.
Edge weights show the probability of an outage at the origin node resulting
in an outage at the destination node.
These qualitative observations can be made quantitative by
applying equations (20) and (24) to H for the 6-bus case. The
importance of component (2-4) to the system can be observed
by computing (20) after setting p0 to indicate that only (2-4)
outages initially, with probability 1. In this case, the expected
cascade size from (20) is aᵀ1 = 5.16. An initial outage of the
other lines in the network is expected to produce much smaller
cascades. For all of the remaining lines aᵀ1 < 2.28. Similarly,
we can estimate the effect of potential upgrades to this system
by computing αj in (24). To do so we choose δ0 = δ1 = δ
equal to 1/2 of the jth column of H for each of the 9 lines in
this network, and set p0 to a vector of initiating probabilities
with p0,i = 0.001, ∀i. The results (unsurprisingly) tell us
that modifications to (2-5) and (4-5) will be most beneficial,
with α(2−5) = 0.021 and α(4−5) = 0.022. αj < 0.015 for
the remaining components. Since they have no in-degree (no
inward links) αi = 0 for (2-4), (3-5) and (3-6).
C. Polish test case results
To test these ideas for a larger network, we computed H0
and H1+ from f [k|i, 0], f [k|i, 1+] and g[j|i], and studied the
properties of the resulting influence graph. Figure 9A shows
H1+ for the Polish test case. While the detailed structure is
difficult to visualize, what is clear is that the influence graph
has a topological structure that is distinctly different from
that of the underlying physical infrastructure of buses and
transmission lines. We argue that this difference in structure at
least partially explains the substantial differences between the
vulnerability implications that one obtains from power grid
simulations and from simple topological metrics computed
from the physical network, as observed in [33].
In order to test our metric for component criticality, we
computed αj for each of the n = 2896 branches. To do so all
of the initiating event probabilities were set to pi,0 = 1/8760,
based on the assumption that all components outage at a rate
of about 1 outage per year. Note that this assumed outage rate
has no effect on our conclusions about which component is
the most critical, since the metric in (23) is scaled uniformly
by p0. Secondly, we computed the perturbations δ0 and δ1
based on an assumed 50% reduction in the propagation rate.
Figure 9B shows the empirical probability distribution for
the resulting criticality metric. This distribution clearly shows
a heavy-tailed (nearly power-law) pattern: while the vast
8Fig. 9. (A) Illustration of the combined H1+ for the Polish test case. Blue nodes/links show the physical power grid, and red nodes/links show the influences
among branch outages. Link thicknesses indicate power flow magnitudes (blue) and influence probabilities (red). Note that for graphical clarity very small
influences are not depicted in this figure. (B) The probability distribution of the metric αi for the same test case. (C) The risk from cascading blackouts
initiated by n− 2 contingencies in the original system before and after increasing flow limits for the ten most critical lines.
majority of the potential upgrades have little-to-no effect
(αj < 10−7 for 83% of the components), a few components
have nearly three orders of magnitude greater impact than this.
To evaluate the extent to which this information could be
useful in a planning context, we performed the following
calculation. We took the ten lines that appeared to be most
critical from αj and then doubled their flow limits used in
the cascading failure simulation, without changing the pre-
contingency dispatch or power flows. Something similar to
this type of increased flow limit could be accomplished by
disabling backup (e.g., Zone 3) relaying systems for these
critical lines, by replacing simple distance relays with more
sophisticated current-differential relaying systems, or by re-
conductoring.
After increasing the line flow limits, we re-simulated the
entire set of n−2 contingencies and recomputed the cascading
failure sizes. While this change does not substantially change
the frequency of small cascades, the impact on the frequency
of very large cascades, which have the greatest impact on
blackout risk, is dramatic. The probability of a cascade that
includes 50 or more outages goes down by 94% in the
modified system. As shown in Fig. 9C, this relatively small
modification reduces the risk of large cascading blackouts
(those resulting in 5% or more load shedding) by about 80%.
Another way to compare these two cases is to look at the
propagation rate λ1+ in the system before and after modifica-
tion. In the original data the propagation rate was λ1+ = 0.92.
In the modified system, the propagation rate is reduced to
λ1+ = 0.79. This relatively small difference can have a large
impact on the probability of large cascades. This is typical
cascading behavior. For example, a simple branching process,
with one initiating outage and 2896 components, has proba-
bility 0.05 of producing a cascade of size 50 or larger at λ =
0.92. If this rate is reduced to λ = 0.79, the probability of rela-
tively small cascades is not changed much, but the probability
of a cascade of 50 or more is reduced by 85% and the prob-
ability of a cascade of size 100 or more is reduced by 96%.
It is important to note that this method of finding critical
upgrades differs substantially from conventional contingency
ranking approaches. Whereas contingency ranking seek to
identify components that would have substantial impact on
the network if they occur as an initiating outage, our method
seeks to find components that are important if they fail during
a cascade. Regardless of this difference, one might conjecture
that standard contingency ranking methods, such as the per-
formance index approach in [34], might work equally as well,
since they can be used to find components that substantially
impact system loading levels. To test whether this was indeed
the case, we computed the performance index from [34] for
each transmission branch in the Polish test case and compared
the result to α from (24). The two metrics showed only a
weak correlation (ρ = 0.2), and α was much more effective
in selecting components for upgrades. Specifically, we used the
performance index method to identify 10 branches for upgrade
(doubling the flow capacity as before), and then simulated the
614 n − 2 contingencies that produced at least 10 dependent
transmission line outages in the re-modified case. While the re-
modified case also produced smaller cascades relative to the
original data, the influence graph method produced a much
larger reduction in cascade sizes (see Table II).
V. DISCUSSION
These results suggest that the influence graph approach
can be used to simulate cascades that are statistically similar
to those produced by an engineering simulator, and (more
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AVERAGE CASCADE SIZES BEFORE AND AFTER UPGRADING 10 LINES
SELECTED FROM EITHER THE PERFORMANCE INDEX (PI) OR INFLUENCE
GRAPH (IG) METHODS
Before After, PI After, IG
Load shed 5910 MW 3682 MW 1324 MW
Dependent outages 55.8 42.5 14.1
usefully) to quickly identify critical components and upgrades
in a large power network. However, it is important to note that
the influence graph is a statistical model, and thus includes as-
sumptions that one should be aware of. Different assumptions
are needed for the formulation, construction and usage of the
model; the following paragraphs explain these assumptions.
The influence graph formulation at the beginning of Sec-
tion II makes the standard branching process assumptions of
independently generating the number of failures in the next
generation from each of the failures in the current generation.
The offspring distributions f are assumed to be Poisson with
parameters λi,m that can vary with component i and with
generation m. The model further assumes that the particular
component failures that fail in the next generation can be
modeled probabilistically as described in (3) for a single
component failure in a generation, and that multiple failures in
a generation propagate independently according to (3). These
assumptions are also usefully discussed in [25]. In addition,
the model assumes that multiple outages in a generation each
propagate independently to the next generation. (This is a
standard and surprisingly successful assumption in applying
branching processes.) We acknowledge that outages can and
do, in real power systems, mutually interact in producing out-
ages in the next generation, but the experience with neglecting
the branching process assumption and assuming independence
in power systems [35], [27] (and other subjects [25]) is that
good predictions of the total number of outages can neverthe-
less be made. In power systems, Refs. [35], [27] validate the
branching process assumption for the purpose of predicting the
total number of line outages using real line outages. Branching
processes can match the distribution of number of simulated
line outages simulated by the OPA simulation in [28] and
load shed simulated by the OPA simulation [36]. There is
also a match for the distribution of load shed for the TRELSS
simulation in one case of an industrial system of about 6250
buses [36]. Moreover, branching processes can analytically
approximate CASCADE, a high-level probabilistic model of
cascading [37] that explicitly models the additive effect of
multiple line outages at each stage.
To estimate the parameters of the model (Section II.A),
one needs to decide on a method for the division of the
outages in each cascade into generations. If there are multiple
outages in a generation, then the offspring of each outage
are approximated by dividing by the number of outages. An
important assumption required for any statistical technique
is that sufficient data was simulated for the estimation of
parameters. The detail in representing the cascading, such as
how much it depends on the cascade generation, must be
traded off against this requirement for sufficient data.
In order to generate cascades with the influence graph in
Section III, one needs an assumption about how to draw from
f and g. There are several possibilities here. For example,
one could draw to obtain precisely the number of outages
indicated by the draw from f , but this would require adjusting
the probabilities in g to reflect the fact that some components
are already outaged. To avoid this, we assume that the draw
from f indicates the number of times one should draw from g.
Since no adjustments to were made to g during this process,
the result is that some components can be marked for failure
multiple times. Since real transmission components cannot
outage multiple times without restoration, we count each failed
component only once.
Finally, in order to perform the linear algebra in (16)-(23)
and hence identify critical elements in Section IV, further
approximations are needed. Higher order probabilities are
neglected to obtain the matrix multiplication in (15), and we
need to allow the system to count the multiple failures of
some components. In addition, in order to allow (19) we need
to assume that H1+ does not change over the course of an
arbitrarily long cascade.
Our approach to estimate the parameters of f , which de-
scribe the propagation of outages, is based on standard Harris
estimators from the theory of branching processes [27]. We use
a rather straightforward approach to estimate the parameters
of g, which describe the network structure and the interactions
between outages. More sophisticated approaches may well
significantly improve the performance of this estimation in
future work, such as starting from Bayesian priors or adapting
graph estimation algorithms from machine learning [38].
There is a need for future work that evaluates each of these
assumptions in detail, and works to identify ways to relax
these assumptions without overcomplicating the model.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a new approach to cascading failure
risk analysis, in which we transform massive amounts of data
from many cascading failures into an “influence graph” that
describes the many ways that cascades propagate within that
system. We check that the (much simpler) influence graph
conforms to the original data by comparing the distribution of
cascading outage sizes from a cascading failure simulator to
the distribution of cascade sizes generated from the influence
graph. The two approaches produce remarkably similar cas-
cade size distributions. In addition, we derive a method with
which the influence graph can be used to quickly identify
component upgrades that can have a significant impact on
cascading failure risk.
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